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There has been an empiricist tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, 
starting with Moritz Schlick and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach), 
according to which the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all 
the explanatory entities posited by scientific theories. The aim of this paper is to 
articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its key elements can find a place 
in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It presents a way empiricism can 
go for scientific realism without metaphysical anxiety, by developing an 
indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist framework. This argument, 
unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to it: there is no ultimate 
argument for the adoption of the realist framework. 
 
 
“Something went wrong with our standard of reality”.  
Quine in ‘Posits and Reality’ 
1 Introduction 
The scientific realism debate has had many dimensions, but a main one has been 
about the reality of unobservable entities that are typically posited by scientific 
theories to explain certain observable phenomena and empirical laws. The very idea 
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of unobservability has been repugnant to some philosophers of science. A number of 
problems have been associated with unobservability. One has had to do with 
semantics: how can we render language to refer successfully to things that are not 
given in experience? What could possibly be the locus of meaning of terms (known as 
theoretical terms) that are supposed to refer to unobservables? Another problem has 
had to do with epistemology: how can we possibly come to know anything about the 
unobservable, if the basis of this knowledge is not rooted in experience? A third 
problem has had to do with metaphysics: what exactly is it to be committed to the 
reality of unobservable entities? How could positing of unobservable entities be 
legitimised? Perhaps, a final problem is methodological: in trying to understand 
science as a practice that involves theory and observation, do we need (and have) to 
read theories as if they aim to tell a true story about the unobservable world behind or 
beyond the phenomena?  
 Why and how these questions arose is a complicated conceptual-historical matter 
that need not concern us here. The fact is that considerable philosophical weight has 
been attached to (un)observability and hence to observers in the realism debate. But 
there is a sense in which the very issue of (un)observability is spurious. That a 
putative entity is unobservable is, if anything, a relational property of this entity and 
has to do with the presence of observers with certain sensory modalities (of the kind 
we have) and not others. That given our sensory modalities some entities have (or 
acquire) this relational property is something science and common-sense tell us. But  
the semantic, or epistemological or metaphysical or methodological limitations or 
restrictions that are supposed to follow from this relational property of some putative 
entity are imposed by philosophical theories that try to interpret science in a certain 
way and do not in any way follow from the unobservability per se.  
In fact, it seems that stating the realism debate in terms of unobservables obscures 
a basic feature of a realist approach to science (perhaps to other fields too), viz., that 
science aims at explanation, which indispensably involves positing microscopic 
constituents of macroscopic things. Scientific explanation is effected by various ways 
and there is no overarching way to explain—it consists in findings causes, describing 
mechanisms, positing more fundamental laws and unifying disparate domains and 
diverse empirical laws. But in most typical cases, the explanation proceeds in terms of 
micro-constituents of gross objects, their properties and their relations. 
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 Placing explanation centre-stage might not be taken to be very empiricist-friendly. 
One issue—perhaps the most prominent—is that this idea of explanation-by-
postulation might raise the spectre of metaphysics, which seems to send shivers down 
empiricist spines. After all, empiricists tend to rest their philosophical views on more 
or less everything on the doctrine that all (non-analytic) knowledge stems from 
(better: is justified on the basis of) experience and they also tend to adhere to the 
claim that the very issue of how, if at all, (commitment to) the reality of some entities 
is licensed, can be settled only by appealing to whatever is given in experience.  
Can an empiricist be committed to the reality of explanatory posits without 
opening the floodgates of metaphysics? This question is far from trivial because an 
outright negative answer to it will land empiricist conceptions of science in the lap of 
instrumentalism. The latter might have a number of features that are congenial to 
empiricism (e.g., the emphasis on prediction and control; the insistence that 
theoretical claims must make a difference in experience, and others). But, on the 
whole, it is a revisioniary stance to science and, besides, not much less metaphysical 
than scientific realism, if taken to deny the reality of theoretical posits. (Perhaps, it is 
less metaphysical, but the denial of a metaphysical thesis is itself metaphysical.) So 
there had better be an answer to the foregoing question which is positive. In 
particular, there had better be an answer which steers empiricism clear from the Scylla 
of metaphysical realism (at least when it affirms that the reality of theoretical entities 
is transcendent—disconnected from any possibility of knowing them) and the 
Charybdis of instrumentalism (at least when it altogether denies the reality of 
theoretical posits). 
 The required positive answer has been actually advanced by flesh-and-blood 
empiricists in the first half of the twentieth century. There has been an empiricist 
tradition in the core of Logical Positivism/Empiricism, starting with Moritz Schlick 
and ending in Herbert Feigl (via Hans Reichenbach) which has taken it to be the case 
that empiricism need not be characterised by ‘phobia of the invisible and the 
intangible’ as Feigl once put it—after all, this phobia would be uncharacteristic of the 
empiricist spirit precisely because it would take something other than science, say 
some philosophical prejudices, as a guide to what there is in the world. According to 
this tradition, the world of empiricism need not be a barren place devoid of all the 
explanatory entities posited by scientific theories; and yet, empiricism need not 
compromise its anti-metaphysical attitude.  
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The aim of this paper is to articulate this tradition and to explore ways in which its 
key elements can find a place in the contemporary debate over scientific realism. It 
will present a way empiricism can go for scientific realism without metaphysical 
anxiety, by developing an indispensability argument for the adoption of the realist 
framework. This argument, unlike current realist arguments, has a pragmatic ring to 
it: there is no ultimate argument for the adoption of the realist framework. The 
guiding thought will be that fundamental ontic questions are framework-questions and 
are not dealt with in the same way in which questions about the reality of ordinary 
entities (be they stones or electrons) are dealt with—the ontic framework must already 
be in place before questions about the reality of specific entities are raised. 
The realist framework, as I would put the matter, is the framework that posits 
entities as constituents of the commonsensical entities and relies on them and their 
properties for the explanation and prediction of the laws and the properties of 
commonsensical entities. Accordingly, the realist framework is an explanatory 
framework, viz., a framework of explanatory posits. In particular, it is a framework 
that explains by positing constituents of macroscopic things. These constituents are 
typically unobservable—meaning: too little to be registered by our unaided sensory 
organs. But it is their explanatory role that is important not their relation to observers. 
Their explanatory role has to do with how they earn their right to be considered real; 
their observability has to do with how they might become known to observers—these 
two things have to be kept apart conceptually (though, clearly, observations—perhaps 
instrument-based observations—can provide good evidence for the reality of an 
explanatory posit).  
 
2 From Metaphysical Realism to Empirical Realism 
Logical empiricism has always been animated by an anti-metaphysical attitude. Part 
of the motivation for verificationism was the thought that it would separate sharply 
metaphysics from science and would leave the former behind. Schlick took it that the 
task of metaphysics was to provide an ultimate description of reality, which unravels 
the true elements of being; the reality as it is in itself. Concomitant to this task was the 
claim that this description is the product of getting direct insight into reality, ‘beyond’ 
or ‘behind’ what science tells us about it. His critique of metaphysics was based on 
the claim that the very idea of legitimately admitting something as real requires 
commitment to the view that it is an object of possible experience. 
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 The verificationist criterion of meaning was Schlick’s way to render his anti-
metaphysical commitment. Here is a statement of it: “A proposition has a stateable 
meaning only if it makes a verifiable difference whether it is true or false” (1932, 88). 
This criterion, actually, plays two roles. On the one hand, it is a tool that warns us not 
to replace one metaphysics with another (e.g., the metaphysics of things-in-
themselves with the metaphysics of the given), but rather to leave metaphysics 
behind, without however leaving behind a rich conception of the world, as this is 
described by the sciences. On the other hand, it offers a definite way to understand 
what it is to admit something as being real. As Schlick (1932, 97) put it: “When we 
say of any object or event—which must be designated by a description—that is real 
this means that there exists a very definite connection between perceptions or other 
experiences, that under certain conditions certain data appear”.  
 As Feigl (1950) observed, by taking verifiability-in-principle as the criterion of 
reality, Schlick conflated the evidence there is (or might be) for the reality of an entity 
and the reality of this entity. Schlick is sometimes guilty as charged.1 But there are 
occasions in which he was very careful to avoid this charge: though verification by 
reference to the given is the touchstone of meaningfulness, it’s a gross 
misunderstanding to claim that what follows from this is that “only the given is real” 
(1932, 104). His overall aim (as this is captured in his Positivism and Realism, 1932) 
was precisely to find a way to steer clear from both instrumentalism and metaphysics 
by advocating what came to be known as empirical realism—aka consistent 
empiricism.  
The verificationist criterion of meaning was meant to secure the possibility of a 
middle ground: theoretical entities are no less real than the observable ones, since 
statements about them are verified (in principle) in the same way as statements about 
observables (cf. 1932, 101). Hence, there is no special problem with admitting the 
reality of unobservable entities. 
Schlick’s empirical realism rests on a literal understanding of scientific theories—
theoretical statements are not re-interpreted; nor are they reduced to whatever can be 
captured by the data of perception. It is nothing like the philosophy of as-if 
(theoretical entities are real and not merely useful fictions); nor, of course, is it 
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committed only to the empirical adequacy of theories.2 As he (1932) makes clear, 
there are definite empirical criteria to determine when an entity (be it a rock or an 
electron) exists; as well as to establish that it exists ‘independently’ of our subjective 
points of view; that it exists ‘externally and independently of us’ and the like. These 
criteria have to do with how beliefs about them are verified. 
 The target of Schlick’s criticism is the view that empirical realism is not realism 
enough; that empirical reality is not reality enough. What he calls metaphysical 
realism is the view that there is a world “somehow standing behind the empirical 
world, where the word ‘behind’ indicates that it cannot be known in the same sense as 
the empirical world, that it lies behind a boundary which separates the accessible from 
the inaccessible” (1932, 102). Note that this transcendental world is not the world of 
electrons and atoms—this is still the empirical world. Schlick’s point is that positing 
such a world makes no verifiable difference. Actually, he (1932, 104) noted, there is a 
difference, but it is only motivational: if we render the world to exist independently of 
us in a seemingly more robust sense, or if we ascribe to it some kind of transcendent 
reality, we feel differently (perhaps we are filled with a robust sense of modesty). 
 So, Schlick’s critique of metaphysics (and in particular his critique of metaphysical 
realism which demands a more robust sense in which theoretical entities are real and 
independent of the mind, subjective points of view etc.) leaves the world as described 
by science entirely intact—a world populated by atoms and fields and whatever else 
our best science tells there is. Science advances by revealing the constituents of things 
that we encounter in perception and the fact that these are (typically) invisible is no 
reason to suppose they are not real. 
 It should be obvious that Schlick has tried to make room for a middle ground 
between anti-instrumentalism and anti-metaphysics and that this ground was meant to 
be captured by empirical realism. There are, however, worries with Schlick’s 
commitment to verificationism and its employment in defence of empirical realism. 
One set of worries has to do with the verificationist criterion of meaning itself. These 
were advanced by Reichenbach (1938), who argued that it should be replaced by a 
(weaker) probability theory of meaning. The other set of worries is that Schlick has 
not yet offered a clear argument for scientific realism. To get to this argument, we 
need to move ahead first to Reichenbach and then to Feigl. 
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3 The Probability of a Framework vs Probabilities within a Framework 
Reichenbach’s Experience and Prediction, which was published in 1938, contains an 
extremely interesting and complex argument for scientific realism. Since I have dealt 
with it in detail in my (forthcoming), I will only offer here the briefest of sketches of 
the final part of Reichenach’s argumentative strategy, which suggests that the 
argument for adopting the realist framework is different from the type of argument 
that licenses acceptance of hypotheses within the framework. 
 The way I reconstruct it, Reichenbach’s (1938, §17) key thought was that the very 
idea of offering arguments for the reality of particular unobservable entities, or of 
particular microscopic constituents of gross things, requires that a certain framework 
is already in place that allows positing unobservable entities as a kind of 
independently existing entities (these are what Reichenbach called ‘projective 
complexes’), distinct from whatever observable effects they might have or marks they 
may leave. To be sure, he put the point in terms of languages (claiming that adopting 
realism is a matter of choosing a certain language, that allows us to talk about 
independently existing physical things (cf. 1938, 145)).  
Once this framework is in place, certain assignments of prior probabilities to 
competing theories become possible, depending on certain plausibility judgements, 
other background beliefs and such like. But the choice of a framework itself (as 
opposed to the choice of hypotheses within it) is not (and cannot be) a matter of 
probability and evidence. We cannot talk of the probability of a framework as a 
whole, mainly because assignment of probabilities is framework-dependent. The very 
idea of assigning probabilities to competing hypotheses within a framework requires 
that the framework is already in place. For instance, we might assign different 
probabilities to the hypothesis that light is made of corpuscles and that light is made 
of waves, but this happens because we already work within a realist framework that 
allows assigning probabilities to hypotheses that posit unobservable entities to explain 
observable behaviour. But if the choice of the realist framework itself were a matter 
of probability and evidence, this would require yet another meta-framework within 
which the realist framework could be placed alongside competing ones in such a way 
that different probabilities are assigned to them. 
The pertinent point that, ultimately, the adoption of the realist framework is not a 
matter of probabilistic inference. Reichenbach goes on to divide the issue into two 
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components—the first is the adoption of a framework as the result of a free (that is, 
non-dictated by evidence or a priori considerations) decision; the second is the 
investigation of the adopted framework by looking into its fruits. This 
consequentialist move is, for Reichenbach, a way to justify the choice of the language 
(framework)—especially by showing, in a comparative fashion, that one language is 
better suited than another to achieve certain aims or to satisfy certain desiderata (cf. 
1938, 146-7). This last move suggests that the original decision to accept a certain 
framework (the realist one that Reichenbach favours) is not arbitrary, though not a 
matter that answers to truth or falsity.  
 Reichenbach insisted that though the choice of a framework is based on an 
unforced decision, this decision entails others—this is what he (1938, 13) called 
“entailed decisions”—which, therefore, are far from arbitrary in that one is no longer 
free not to adopt them if one has already chosen the framework. By examining these 
‘entailed decisions’ certain judgements can be made about the consequences of 
adopting a certain framework, their plausibility and their fruitfulness. A case which 
Reichenbach discusses in some detail is the choice between an egocentric framework, 
in which objects do not exist while unperceived, and a realist one. Even if it is a 
matter of unforced decision to adopt an egocentric framework, one entailed decision 
that follows this is the adoption of strange causal laws and an unhomogeneous 
principle of causation. This principle might be contestable, or implausible, on 
independent grounds and this would count against the framework that requires it. The 
very presence of entailed decisions helps to build, as Reichenbach (1938, 15) put it, “a 
dam” against “extreme conventionalism”.3 
Reichenbach did argue that the adoption of the realist framework is not a matter to 
be settled in the same way as the acceptance of scientific theories is settled, viz., by 
judgements of probability and evidence. So the argument for realism is not based on 
judgements of probability and evidence. But the choice of realism is not arbitrary 
either. What considerations then support the choice of the realist framework, even if 
they do not dictate it? The elements for an answer can be found in Feigl’s 
reformulation of Schlick’s empirical realism. 
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4 Empiricism’s Copernican Turn 
Like Reichenbach, Feigl too was dissatisfied with the verificationist criterion of 
meaning. In particular, he thought it cannot sustain a criterion of reality. According to 
Feigl (1950, 48), verificationism runs together two separate issues: the “epistemic 
reduction” of an assertion—aka “the evidential basis” for the truth of the assertion—
and “the semantical relation of designation (i.e., reference)”. Verificationism, in other 
words, conflates the issue of what constitutes evidence for the truth of an assertion 
with the issue of what would make this assertion true. What Feigl came to call 
“semantic realism” was put forward as “a corrected form and refinement of the 
empirical realism held by some logical positivists or empiricists” (1950, 50). For him 
the idea that theoretical terms have (putative) factual reference captures, as it were, 
the valid residue of claims about independent existence: to say that electrons exist is 
to say that the term ‘electron’ has factual reference, that is that there are things in the 
world which are the referents of the term ‘electron’. Unobservable entities are no less 
real than observable entities, given that, as Feigl put it, “they are on a par within the 
nomological framework” of modern science (cf. ibid.).  
Feigl considered Schlick’s empirical realism to be part and parcel of “the gradual 
liberation of theory from the bondage of metaphysics” (1943[1949], 11), which he 
took it to be one of the achievements of empiricism. In endorsing empirical realism, 
Feigl said: “The term ‘real’ is employed in a clear sense and usually with good reason 
in daily life and science to designate that which is located in space-time and which is 
a link in the chains of causal relations. It is thus contrasted with the illusory, the 
fictitious and the purely conceptual. The reality, in this sense, of rocks and trees, of 
stars and atoms, of radiations and forces, of human minds and social groups, of 
historical events and economic processes, is capable of empirical test” (1943[1949], 
16). 
 This, it should be obvious, motivates a criterion of reality which is different from 
that of verificationism. Here is how he put it: “(…) Reality is ascribed to whatever is 
required (confirmed) as having a place in the spatio-temporal-causal system” (1950, 
51). On this criterion, there is no special problem with being committed to the reality 
of a host of explanatory posits (typically unobservable entities) assumed by theories, 
since they are part and parcel of the causal-nomological framework described by 
science. 
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Feigl is not entirely clear as to how exactly he conceives of the realist framework. 
He (1950, 54) describes it as the “conceptual frame of the realist language”. But he 
(1950, 59) also talks directly about the realist frame of “space-time-causality-matter”. 
I think it does justice to Feigl to claim that a framework is linguistic only in a 
derivative way, viz., that we need means to talk (and to form generalisations) about 
the new type of entity. What matters most is the new type of entity. So, as noted in the 
Introduction, the realist framework is primarily an ontic framework—it posits 
(assumes the existence of) a new kind of entity. We could call this type of entity 
‘unobservable entity’—but as already noted the issue of (un)observability is a red 
herring. Assuming the life-world we live in, of gross middle-sized macroscopic 
objects, the realist framework posits a new type of entity: being a constituent of 
macroscopic entities. The realist framework takes it that the world has a deep 
structure of microscopic entities which ‘make up’ the macroscopic ones.  
Like Reichenbach but more forcefully than him, Feigl (1950, 54 & 57) took it that 
the adoption of the realist framework is not based on the same considerations as the 
adoption of specific scientific theories, the reason being that the adoption of scientific 
theories is based—by and large—on their degree of confirmation (that is, on how 
likely they are given the available evidence). But it does not make sense to talk about 
the degree of confirmation of the realist framework; the latter should already be in 
place for the degree of confirmation of certain theories to be possible. In other words, 
we cannot even start talking about the probability that there are electrons, or quarks or 
whatever unless we have already adopted the frame of theoretical entities. Feigl too 
claimed that the adoption of the realist frame is, ultimately, a matter of convention: it 
is based on a decision to expand the conceptual framework through which we theorise 
about the world.4  
Though Feigl echoed Reichenbach’s views on entailed decisions, there is a twist in 
his argumentative strategy in relation to Reichenbach’s. The decision to adopt the 
realist framework, Feigl argued, requires a Copernican turn. Whereas empiricism has 
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started with the world of experience and has aimed to show how the object of science 
should be made to fit within the object of perception, realism should take the object of 
perception to fit within the object of science. Better put, perception is epistemically 
special because it is through this that human beings get to know what the world is 
like, but the data of perception (as well as the perceivers) are part of the natural world, 
as this is described by science, and the question is how they fit into the thus described 
natural world. As Feigl put it: “The Copernican turn then consists in relating the 
observer to the observed, the indicator to the indicated,—not epistemically,—but so to 
speak cosmologically” (1950, 41—emphasis added). So: the move from empiricism to 
scientific realism requires a change of perspective.  
 
5 An Indispensability Argument for the Realist Framework 
Unlike Kant’s own, the empiricists’ Copernican turn is not based on a transcendental 
argument—the claim is not that without realism science would not be possible etc. 
Though Feigl might not have put it in quite those terms, the argument for the 
Copernican turn is that the realist framework is indispensable for achieving causal and 
nomological coherence in our image of the world and for offering cogent explanations 
of the behaviour of gross objects.5 What is more, the realist frame does not leave the 
world of experience intact. When necessary, it corrects it “from above”, as Feigl put 
it. It corrects empirical laws and explains why certain objects fail to obey certain 
empirical laws.6  
Here is how the argument could be stated with a bit more precision.  
 
(A) 
Positing microscopic constituents of gross objects is indispensable for having a 
causally-nomologically coherent image of the world (viz., a simple and unified 
system of causal laws). (Relatedly, we cannot have cogent explanations of the 
behaviour of gross objects (including their deviations from the behaviour predicted by 
empirical laws) save in terms of positing microscopic constituents.)  
                                                 
5
 Feigl did talk about indispensability, when he (1950, 55) argued against phenomenalism that it needs 
to locate in space and time the events that constitute the antecedents and consequents of factual and 
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phenomenalistic language. Of this locating and dating, Feigl said that “it indispensably requires the 
‘realistic’ frame”. 
6
 This kind of argument became famous by Wilfrid Sellars (1963) in his defence of the scientific image 
of the world. For more on this, see my (2004). 
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To be an indispensable element of the causally-nomologically coherent image of the 
world is to be real.  
 
Therefore, the microscopic constituents of gross objects are real. 
 
I assume that the first premise of this argument is now uncontentious, though it 
was not quite so when Feigl was writing.7 So I will focus on the second premise. How 
and why is indispensability a criterion of reality?  
Two thoughts are relevant here; the first concerns indispensability; the second 
concerns the criterion of reality itself. Let us start with the second thought. If we take 
the empiricist critique of traditional metaphysics seriously, there is no framework-free 
standpoint from which what there is (the fundamental building blocks, if you wish) 
can be viewed. The question of what there is (better: the question of what one is 
committed to) can only be settled within a framework and its answer has to do with 
what types of entity have to be assumed for the framework to play the role it is 
supposed to do. Feigl was particularly keen to block the idea that experienceability is 
a criterion of reality. If there is more to reality than what can be directly experienced, 
and if this more should be dissociated from epistemic conceptions as to how it can be 
known, it is very plausible to think that the touchstone of reality is being part of the 
causal-nomological structure of the world. The requirement of indispensability 
strengthens this criterion. Assuming some entities is not enough, if, as Quine (1960, 
260) has aptly put it, we have found “a way of accomplishing those same purposes 
through other channels”. If the assumed entities can be dispensed with without failure 
to achieve what the framework aims to achieve, the question of their reality becomes 
moot. If, on the other hand, positing these entities is indispensable, there is no residual 
question to be asked as to whether they are real. For there is no framework-free 
standpoint from which this further question can be asked.  
Is there a tension here? One the one hand, theoretical entities are deemed 
indispensable;8 on the other hand, the decision to adopt the realist framework is an 
                                                 
7
 Carnap (1939, 64) came close to an argument like this, when he stressed that without using theoretical 
terms it “is not possible to arrive (...) at a powerful and efficacious system of laws. But he was quite 
reluctant (at least until the late 1950s) to move from this claim to the indispensability of theoretical 
entities. 
 13 
unforced decision. How can that be? The answer, I think, is this. Indispensability 
arguments work only relative to accepting certain aims. Nothing is indispensable 
simpliciter. Some things (that is, commitment to the reality of some entities) might be 
indispensable for a certain purpose or aim. To say that theoretical entities are 
indispensable is to say that there cannot be (weaker: it’s unlikely that there are) ways 
to fulfil certain aims (advancement of attractive theories, explanation of observable 
phenomena, predictions of further observable phenomena, development of a unified 
causal-nomological image of the world) which dispense with positing theoretical 
entities. But the choice of aims is not forced. One can simply refrain from adopting a 
certain aim. Hence, there is an implicit or unstated premise in argument (A) above, 
viz., that aiming for a coherent causal-nomological image of the world is desirable.  
We should be careful to distinguish between the realist framework and ordinary 
scientific theories. The Copernican turn has to do with a change of perspective; a 
change in the way empiricists view the world: as having a deep structure which 
grounds/explains its surface structure, i.e., the way it is revealed to cognizers through 
their sensory modalities. The adoption of the framework implies commitment to 
theoretical entities through which a coherent causal-nomological view of the world is 
achieved. Adopting the realist framework does not dictate commitment to any specific 
scientific theory. This is a matter that has to do with the evidence there is for or 
against scientific theories. Matters of evidence and justification arise only after the 
framework has been adopted. What, however, the adoption of the realist framework 
does dictate is that scientific theories that ostensibly introduce new types of entity 
should be taken as doing exactly that, viz., as positing entities that explain and predict 
the behaviour of observables.  
It can then be said that the Copernican turn is supplemented with two further 
points. The first is a criterion of reality: that is real which is required within the 
causal-nomological frame of science. The second is a criterion for acceptance (or 
justified belief, if you like): whatever hypotheses are confirmed within this frame are 
our best candidates for justified belief as to what the world is like. These two points 
suggest the following: scientific realism asserts the reality of theoretical entities, but 
which entities we have reason to believe are real is a function of the degree of 
confirmation of scientific theories.  
                                                                                                                                            
8
 I have used the term ‘theoretical entity’ because it is customary and because the micro-constituents of 
macroscopic objects are typically introduced via relatively sophisticated theories of the macro-world. 
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In what sense are theoretical entities independently existing entities? For an 
empiricist like Feigl, ‘independent existence’ is primarily conceived of as existence in 
its own right, that is irreducible existence. Explanatory posits are not anything else: 
they are not complexes of data of perception; nor façon de parler, nor useful fictions 
and the like. Commitment to this kind of independence is licensed by the fact that 
theories have ‘excess content’ over whatever could be described in a purely 
observational language and they are indispensable in explaining why the observable 
phenomena are the way they are. This might not be taken to be a heavyweight 
conception of independence. But a) that’s precisely the point, viz., that this notion of 
independence is strong enough to secure commitment to the reality of theoretical 
entities without creating further metaphysical anxieties; and b) taken in association 
with the Copernican turn, it does highlight the fact that reality is not constrained by 
what can be known but by what is required to restore causal-nomological unity to the 
world.  
This, it might be thought, is a weak conception of independence, which might be 
suitable for empiricists. But is going for it a big concession on the part of realism? 
Not necessarily. The key point so far is two-fold: a) that the adoption of the realist 
framework is not based on the same type of argument as the adoption of ordinary 
scientific theories; and b) that the realist framework is not forced on us either by a 
priori reasoning or by any empirical facts. This implies that there is an element of 
choice in adopting realism. But given that a certain aim is chosen, the choice is 
constrained. The realist framework is indispensable if certain aims are to be achieved 
or if certain desiderata (some of which might well be dear to its rivals) are to be 
satisfied. As Grover Maxwell (1962) suggested, a condition of adequacy for a 
framework suitable for the development of scientific theories is that it should be able 
to offer explanations of the phenomena. The realist framework satisfies this condition 
in the best way. 
Note that nowhere has it been said or implied that theoretical entities are mind-
dependent. To say that positing theoretical entities is a matter of adopting a 
framework (and not a matter of direct insight into the metaphysical structure of the 
world) is not to say that the posited entities are mind-dependent. The act of positing is 
mind-dependent. But to say that the posited entities themselves are mind-dependent is 
to say (mutatis mutandis) that scoring a goal in football is mind-dependent—which is 
not. 
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 All this is relevant to the status of the no miracles argument. As is well-known, 
Putnam (and following him Boyd, and following him myself and others) took realism 
to be a theory and in particular an empirical theory that gets supported by the success 
of science because it best explains this success. There are quite interesting differences 
between the exact ways in which Putnam, Boyd and myself conceived of this 
argument; but the overarching common thought was that realism (as a theory) gets 
supported by the relevant evidence (the success of science) in the very same way in 
which first-order scientific theories get supported by the relevant evidence. But 
scientific realism is not a theory; it’s a framework which makes possible certain ways 
of viewing the world. Scientific realism lacks all the important features of a scientific 
theory. Even if we thought we could reconstruct scientific realism as a theory for the 
purposes of epistemology of science, we had better follow Feigl and say: “you can 
view ordinary realism in analogy to scientific theories, but be careful in doing so!”. 
The problem lies in the thought that scientific realism can be supported by the same 
type of argument that scientific theories are supported. This is a tempting thought. But 
it is flawed, I now think. The reason for this claim is that the very idea of counting 
empirical success as being in favour of the truth of a scientific theory—the very idea 
of evidence making a theory probable, or the very idea that a theory is the best 
explanation of the evidence, and the like—presupposes that theories are already 
placed within the realist framework. For the no-miracles argument to work at all it is 
presupposed that explanation—and in particular explanation by postulation—matters 
and that scientific theories should be assessed and evaluated on explanatory grounds. 
Hence, the no-miracles argument works within the realist framework; it’s not an 
argument for it.9 It presupposes rather than establishes the realist frame. Still, within 
the realist framework, the no-miracles argument has an important role to play, and 
this, as I have argued in my (1999), is to offer a vindication of inference to the best 
explanation.10  
                                                 
9
 A recent paper which casts fresh light on the role of the no-miracles argument in the realism debate is 
Ghins (2001). 
10
 The way I read it, the no-miracles argument is a philosophical argument that aims to defend the 
reliability of scientific methodology in producing approximately true theories and hypotheses (see my 
1999, 78-81). Its conclusion proceeds in two steps. The first step is that we should accept as 
(approximately) true the theories that are implicated in the (best) explanation of the instrumental 
reliability of first-order scientific methodology. The second step is that since, typically, these theories 
have been arrived at by means of IBE, IBE is reliable. What makes the no-miracles argument 
distinctive as an argument for realism is that it defends the achievability of theoretical truth. The 
second step of the conclusion is supposed to secure this. The background scientific theories, which are 
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By the same token, sweeping agnosticism towards theoretical entities is an oddity! 
One can certainly be agnostic about specific posits (e.g., dragons or electrons). This 
kind of stance is fine, since there may not be enough evidence for them. But can one 
coherently be agnostic about the framework while one is using it? Can one neither 
affirm it nor deny it, but nonetheless employ it (perhaps with an as-if operator in the 
front) and reap its fruits? I doubt this can be done coherently within the framework. A 
sweeping agnostic seems to intend to occupy a position within the framework (by 
using it to explain and predict) and at the same time outside the framework (by 
treating it as a useful fiction). One can, of course, deny the framework and adopt a 
different one, viz., a fictionalist one. But this is not agnosticism.  
Given that the realist framework is adopted, the claim that there are theoretical 
entities cannot be coherently denied unless the realist framework is abandoned. It is 
constitutive of the framework. The framework itself, however, is not an object of 
belief or doubt. It can either be shown to be dispensable or less efficient than others 
when it comes to achieving a certain aim. Specific theories within the framework, or 
specific commitments within it (e.g., concerning electrons), can be doubted and 
challenged. These will be epistemic doubts having to do with evidence and possible 
specific explanatory alternatives. 
 
6 A Concluding Remark 
With all this in mind, we can say that the adoption of the scientific realist framework 
is based on the indispensability of theoretical entities for the explanation of 
observable phenomena and for achieving maximum causal and nomological 
coherence in our image of the world. Theoretical entities are indispensable for the 
causal unity of the world. Theoretical entities ensure enhanced predictability of, and 
control over, nature. Their presence makes a difference to what can be predicted (see 
the case of novel predictions), to what kinds of interventions can happen in the world 
(see the manipulations of theoretical entities in controlled experiments) and to what 
corrections can be made to empirically established regularities (see the 
revision/correction of the manifest image of the world). Relative to these aims, there 
                                                                                                                                            
deemed approximately true, have themselves been arrived at by abductive reasoning. Hence, it is 




is simply no framework that can do a better job at achieving them than the realist one. 
This is already enough of an argument for realism, even though it is not an ultimate 
argument for realism. 
 
Appendix 
The reader will rightly wonder how the above relate to Carnap’s distinction between 
external and internal questions and to Quine’s critique of it. Because this matter is 
quite complex, it cannot be treated in a (long) footnote. Actually, it can be argued that 
historically and conceptually Carnap and Quine offered two distinct (but in an 
important sense related) ways to develop the rapprochement between empiricism and 
scientific realism, as this was developed in the Schlick-Reichenbach-Feigl tradition of 
empirical realism.  
 The way I read it, Carnap (1950) wanted to exclude external theoretical questions. 
What are they? These are questions about the reality of a general type (or category) of 
entity which are supposed to be settled by looking for (empirical) evidence for the 
reality of this type or by insight into the metaphysical structure of the world, and 
whose answer is supposed to be the content of a belief-like propositional attitude. 
Carnap denied that a question of the sort ‘Are there entities (of type) X?’ has any 
cognitive content, if it is meant to be asked as an external theoretical question. 
Differently put, questions concerning the reality of a type of entity are legitimate and 
have content, but only if they are taken to be either external practical questions 
concerning the benefits of adopting a certain framework which includes this type of 
entity in its basis ontic inventory or as internal theoretical questions concerning the 
evidence there is for (or other reasons for accepting the reality of) certain tokens of 
this type, but only after a framework has been adopted. 
 Famously, Carnap thought that external practical questions are answered by the 
adoption of linguistic frameworks. A linguistic framework is characterised by the 
adoption of a new type of concept, suitable for the new type of entity, and a new type 
of variable, ranging over instances of the new type of entity. This kind of way to view 
the framework was part of the reason why Quine (1951) was very critical of Carnap’s 
distinction. He thought that the external/internal distinction amounted to a proposal to 
segregate variables: it distinguished between category questions (which purported to 
exhaust the range of a particular variable) and subclass questions (which did not 
exhaust the range of this variable). Quine rightly thought that this was wrong.  
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But Quine agreed with Carnap (and with Schlick, Reichenbach and Feigl) on a 
fundamental point, central to the issue we have been discussing, viz., that there is no 
theory-free standpoint from which what there is can be viewed. For him, however, 
there is no sharp line between theoretical issues (or questions) and practical ones. 
Ontological questions (questions about what there is) are theoretical questions as well 
as practical ones: they are answered by best theory and there is no extra-theoretical 
court of appeal. The best theory just is the theory that works sufficiently well—in 
particular the theory that tallies with the evidence and satisfies a number of virtues, 
most notably simplicity. For Quine, the utility of a posit and its reality go hand in 
hand.11  
There are a number of subtle issues to be discussed here (mostly concerning 
Quine’s naturalism and his view that the external/internal distinction is another way to 
render the analytic/synthetic distinction); but we shall not deal with them presently.12 
Instead, I will sum up the two ways to articulate Carnap’s and Quine’s common 
thought that there is no theory-free standpoint from which what there is can be 
viewed.  
If we go Carnap’s way, then:  
1. Commitment to the reality of a general type (or ontic category) of entity is not at 
the same level (and is not governed by the same rules) as commitment to particular 
entities of this type.  
2. Commitment to the reality of a general type of entity is not a matter of evidence; 
nor a matter of insight into the metaphysical structure of the world; nor a matter of 
adopting a theory (like an ordinary scientific theory). It is a matter of adopting a 
framework which posits this type.  
3. The adoption of the framework is not a theoretical issue (though it is influenced by 
theoretical considerations.  
If we go Quine’s way, then ‘framework’ principles are, in essence, the most 
general hypotheses of our overall theory of the world: 
                                                 
11
 Though Carnap did insist on the practical-theoretical distinction, he did not think there was no give-
and-take between the two: theoretical considerations can and do influence practical decisions and 
conversely. 
12
 For a very nice recent account of the issue between Carnap and Quine concernign ontology, see 
Alspector-Kelly (2001). 
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1’. There is no difference between the framework and the theories within it. The 
framework is a theory (perhaps a general one) and is judged using the same evidential 
standards and pragmatic considerations as in the case of ordinary theories. 
2’. The entities we are committed to are those that are required for the truth of our 
overall best theory of the world. These are real entities in the only sense we can make 
of the word ‘real’. 
3’. The best theory of the world is the theory licensed by the scientific method.  
The appearance of a gulf between Carnap’s way and Quine’s way might fade away 
if we take on board Quine’s distinction between ontology and ideology. In his (1951a, 
13), he noted: “For the universal and existential quantifiers mean simply ‘every entity 
(of appropriate type) is such that’ and ‘some entity (of appropriate type) is such that’. 
The theory presupposes all and any of those entities whose nonoccurrence within the 
ranges of the variables of quantification would render parts of the theory false. There 
is doubtless more to metaphysics than ontology in the above sense; and some of this 
additional matter is perhaps thought of also as ontology in some sense” (1951a, 13). 
This ‘additional matter’ is what Quine calls “ideology”: “I have described the 
ideology of a theory vaguely as asking what ideas are expressible in the language of 
the theory” (op.cit., 15). As he put it in (1983, 501), the ideology of a theory is “a 
stock of simple and complex terms or predicates”. 
Quine did not develop this notion of ideology further, but it seems that a fruitful 
way to go ahead is to say that ideology goes beyond ontology because it deals with 
the prior issue of what general types (categories) of entity a theory assumes. The 
ideology provides the framework within which questions of ontology (in the Quinean 
sense of it) can be raised. Consider then the following two kinds of question: 
 
(A) what entities is a scientific theory (e.g., the electron theory) committed to?  
(B) what kinds of entity are required if a coherent causal-nomological image of the 
world is to be achieved?  
  
Carnap would have it that (B) is a framework question. Carnap’s thought was 
precisely that (B) is not answered by metaphysical insight—or by telling the correct 
metaphysical story, as if there were theory-unmediated access to the world. A 
Quinean might well take (B) to be a question of ideology. To see how this can be, let 
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us consider a familiar example. Consider advocates of the kind of instrumentalism 
based on Craig’s theorem). They replace all theories with their Craig-transforms, 
which, as is well-known, is devoid of theoretical terms. Take a ‘theory’ Craig(T) of T. 
Questions of type (A) can surely be raised vis-à-vis Craig(T). If, for instance, T is the 
theory of electrons, its Craig (T) does not assume any electrons. But questions of type 
(B) are of a different order. They do not concern individual theories but whether or 
not a framework is accepted which dispenses altogether with theoretical terms and 
their putative reference to theoretical entities. Put in Quinean terms, whether or not 
we should we go for Craig(T) type of theories is a matter of ideology—of what types 
of entity are allowed or admitted. Put in Carnapian terms, it is a matter of adopting a 
framework. 
The way I would put the general point is this. Admitting instances of an ontic 
category requires admitting (assuming the existence of) the category. And admitting 
an ontic category is basically admitting a framework (or an ideology) within which 
this category plays an explanatory role. 
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